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This article considers the current decision of the Home Secre-
tary to scrap the 43 police forces and replace them with 12–15
regional strategic police forces. This follows on from the
recent report of HMIC, entitled Closing the Gap, published in
September 2005, which was to conclude that as currently
constituted the police structure for England and Wales was no
longer ‘fit for purpose’. Using the ability of police services to
provide an effective response to NIM Level 2 crime as a
yardstick, HMIC was to find that any force with fewer than
4,000 police officers would be unlikely to be able to provide an
adequate response.
One consequence of the report and the Home Secretary’s
response to it has been the request made to all police author-
ities and forces to present a business case to the Home Office
by the end of 2005 identifying the future structure of policing
in the region and the pattern of amalgamation they might
favour. In the course of this exercise it was to be found that
alternatives to amalgamation, collaboration and federation, had
both been closed down by the Home Secretary, who has
concluded that only the option of amalgamation was now
acceptable to his department.
Subsequently it was to be learned that a number of factors
influencing HMIC’s 2005 report obtained that had not been
taken into account. These included the decision on the part of
HMIC specifically not to include the written section on force
collaboration within the final report. Nor, it was also to be
discovered, had recognition been given within the report to the
expectation that implementation was to be carried out in con-
junction with comprehensive Workforce Modernisation. A
leaked memorandum from ODPM in late 2005 that local gov-
ernment reform was now under active consideration was also to
undermine the earlier assumption on the part of HMIC that no
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plans for local government reform were currently planned and
that unilateral police reorganisation was therefore appropriate.
Introduction
In what has proved to be almost unprecedented in terms of speed
of implementation, the Home Secretary has given deadlines for
all forces to provide him with plans for future amalgamations on
a regional basis. This follows on from HMIC’s report Closing
the Gap (2005) which was to find that, as currently constituted,
many police forces were unable in terms of manpower and
resources to support a range of protective services and this had to
be addressed with some degree of urgency. In response to this,
many police authorities, albeit reluctantly, have agreed to draw
up business plans for restructuring. However, it has also become
apparent in the short period within which this exercise has been
conducted that there are significant differences between tripartite
members as to what form the eventual outcome of reform is
likely to take.
Within ACPO, for example, there appears to be a view that
reform will merely involve a significant enlargement of current
police forces, with a stronger ‘protective service’ element cre-
ated within these forces. It is clear, however, that this perception
is not shared by other tripartite members, not least among
members of the Home Office Ministerial Team, one of whom
has argued that reform will necessarily involve a quite funda-
mental reorganisation of police service delivery. The ‘recon-
figuration’ of policing, Hazel Blears has stated, must ensure that
the police service does not end up with bigger versions of what it
already has. She has stressed that to reconfigure policing is not
just a matter of ‘merging together’ (Pertile, 2005a).
The Minister’s perception of the reconfiguration process is
linked of course to the decision to direct much more attention to
and investment in National Intelligence Model Level 2 crime
while also rolling out the new Neighbourhood Policing strategy.
Investing in protective services cannot, it would appear, there-
fore take place at the expense of local neighbourhood policing.
This, the Minister has stated, remains at the hub of the reform
process.
Sleepless Nights
Yet it is also evident that the potential tensions generated by a
concurrent emphasis on both NIM Level 2 and Level 1 crime
within police forces could create significant problems in the
overall delivery of police services to the public. These are likely
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to lead to many more ‘sleepless nights’ for the Inspector of
Constabulary, whose review of today’s police forces triggered
the current restructuring exercise, than those already experienced
by that officer to date (Pertile, 2005b).
It is also evident that in the preparation of the HMIC report
Closing the Gap there have been some notable omissions. While
police authorities, for instance, were ostensibly to be given the
opportunity to identify both collaboration and federation with
other local police forces as an alternative to the creation of
strategic forces, these options were to be quickly closed down by
the Home Secretary. This may have reflected an earlier decision
within HMIC not to include the written section on ‘collabora-
tion’ within the final report.
Neither was it to be made clear that much of what was to be
argued within the same report was predicated on the com-
prehensive implementation of the ‘workforce modernisation’
programme now being piloted in some police forces. Workforce
modernisation, particularly that pertaining to a significant
increase in the employment of PCSOs was presumably seen as
essential, not least because of the significant manpower invest-
ment that building up protective services would necessarily
involve. Currently that is only likely to be achieved by sub-
stantial abstractions from current visible policing strength. Inevi-
tably this could seriously impact on Level 1 policing while
severely eroding the effectiveness of the planned implementation
of future neighbourhood policing strategies.
The Absence of a Strategic Tier of Government
The recent HMIC report (2005) mentioned above has been the
primary driver for reform and the planned creation of ‘strategic
police forces.. This report has identified serious weaknesses in
the ability of many police forces to respond to ‘Level 2’ crime
and recommends restructuring of police forces to enable the
police service to deal effectively with ‘protective services’ in
England and Wales.
As is quickly apparent within HMIC’s report, the emphasis is
quite understandably almost entirely directed towards opera-
tional policing matters and does not seek to address issues of
future police governance that will be generated by the proposed
restructuring of police forces. No recommendations are made
concerning future police governance of the ‘strategic forces’ or
indeed of local policing arrangements.
Although a number of options were to be identified within
HMIC’s report concerning future police structures, which
The Police Journal, Volume 78 (2005) 341
included the option of closer collaboration, the Home Office has
already indicated that it has a preference for regional strategic
police forces.
The ‘Strategic Police Force’ option, it is argued, will enable
all restructured police forces to provide adequate ‘protective
services’. While providing such a service the proposed structures
will inevitably be extremely remote from local communities and
indeed current local government. This matter becomes more
pressing when it is recognised that outside regional government
offices there is no political or administrative infrastructure to
support the proposed new policing arrangements. It is as yet
unclear what precise relationship will be established between the
planned ‘Police Commissioners’ made responsible for managing
the new regional forces and either regional government office or
any regional strategic authority.
The planned restructuring at regional level for policing
occurs at a time when the public in the north-east have demon-
strated a pronounced rejection by way of referendum of pro-
posed regional government bodies as recommended by the
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). In the absence of
a regional authority the expectation must be that strategic police
forces will be matched by the creation of ‘regional police author-
ities’ that can be expected to be as remote geographically and
administratively as will the proposed police commissioners.
In defence of the effective removal of police governance
from local authorities and communities, HMIC’s report goes to
some length to stress that the reform of police structures can be
embarked upon because of the stability demonstrated at a local
level by Basic Command Units (BCUs), which now operate
across all police forces.
Current Confusion of the Role and Status of the BCU
The emphasis placed within the HMIC report on the BCU
structure and its stability is used as a defence for the proposed
strategic restructuring of police forces. Yet it is evident that
outside unitary authorities and the metropolitan areas BCUs have
not to date exhibited anything like the level of stability to which
HMIC lays claim on their behalf. Indeed the recent history of
BCUs in the provinces has been one of constant change and
disruption as BCU boundaries have been significantly and
regularly altered by police force senior management teams
(Loveday, 2005).
Clear evidence of the problems surrounding BCU boundaries
was to be provided within the Home Secretary’s ACPO speech at
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Birmingham in 2005. Here the Home Secretary was to request
specifically that BCU boundaries should be drawn in such a way
by SMT as to encourage ‘coterminosity of boundaries’ between
the BCU and the local authority. This was to be followed by a
letter sent to the ACPO Chair inviting that officer to request that
all forces should identify coterminosity with local authorities as
an immediate aim, particularly those dozen or so forces that had
to date failed entirely to establish this at BCU level.
The precise role and function of the BCU is also as yet to be
fully determined. This is currently reflected in the absence of any
consensus as to what constitutes a viable size for a BCU. To
date, as determined by police establishments, numbers identified
within the police service as necessary for supporting viable
BCUs has moved from 250 police officers in the early 1990s to
over 1,000 by the end of that decade (Loveday, 2005:4). How-
ever, as with police forces the current pressure placed on BCUs
is towards their further enlargement.
Other than that developed by the Police Superintendents
Association (2004), very little analysis has been conducted into
what is a viable size for a BCU. However, the primary purpose
of the BCU was by way of flattening hierarchies to enable local
commanders to effectively oversee and manage the local unit of
policing. Nevertheless the ability of this officer to effectively
manage units of policing involving establishments of 1,000 and
above is clearly questionable. Whereas in Bristol Central police
area there is a police establishment of over 1,000 and several
hundred support staff, the ‘BCU’ might be more accurately
designated a ‘city police force’ as it no longer exhibits the
features of a police command as originally devised for a BCU.
Limitations of BCU Function within Non-Metropolitan
Counties and the Problem of District Authority Boundaries
There are currently additional problems that are closely linked to
the current and future roles of the BCU. These relate almost
wholly to non-metropolitan counties where a two-tier division of
service delivery responsibilities pertains. Here the very size and
number of local district authorities can make the creation of
coterminous boundaries difficult if not impossible to achieve.
One consequence of the number and size of local district
councils is that currently most BCUs can expect to host a
number of local district councils within their police boundary.
This can prove to be problematical for the local police manage-
ment team, particularly in the context of Crime and Disorder
Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) work when local district aims
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and expectations concerning crime reduction strategies can differ
significantly. It is also now accepted that for CDRP work to
succeed there is a clear need for the BCU boundary to be
coterminous with that of one local authority (Police Super-
intendents Association, 2004).
It is of interest within this context that the Police Super-
intendents Association has recently concluded that in relation to
the delivery of effective policing the need for coterminous
boundaries is the single most critical factor in determining
whether a BCU is likely to deliver that policing (Police Super-
intendents Association, 2004). Interestingly, to date HMIC has
never identified this as a measure of effectiveness and has also
failed to collect data from police forces on this important
element of contemporary policing.
From the foregoing it would appear that any suggestion that
BCU structures exhibit stability within the non-metropolitan
context would be wholly misleading. As CDRP delivery is
district driven there is a real need for a wider strategic oversight
that is able both to rise above local district level and provide a
structure for police governance at sub-regional level.
A number of commentators on police reform while arguing
for structural reform have done so on the basis of further local
government reorganisation (O‘Byrne, 2001; Loveday 2004;
2005). Indeed it could be argued that reform of police structures
can only be successfully implemented if pursued in conjunction
with local government reorganisation, which would, in this case,
be linked to ending the two-tier division of local government by
the creation of unitary authorities. These could be expected to
sustain a BCU structure successfully while also providing a
future basis for local police governance.
Some Consequences of Non-reform of Local Government
Structures
HMIC’s 2005 report was to note that there was no plan currently
under consideration within ODPM for local government
reorganisation. This in part was to be used as a justification for
unilateral police reform. Subsequently, however, a ‘leak’ of
minutes from ODPM Minister David Milliband was to demon-
strate that reform of local government to create one-tier unitary
authorities was in fact under active consideration and followed
on from an earlier review of the current structure announced
early on in 2005 (Loveday, 2005). This might suggest that police
reform could benefit from following on from local government
reorganisation rather than preceding it.
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However, at this point such local authority reorganisation yet
remains a matter of speculation. One consequence of non-reform
must be that with the removal upward to regional level of
strategic police forces there will inevitably be a new and
significant ‘gap’ created at local level in terms of both police
governance and the work of CDRPs. These responsibilities
cannot be exercised by local district councils as currently con-
stituted, not least because their current boundaries rarely match
that of local BCUs.
For this reason among others there will be a clear need at
county council level for a body which is able to provide a police
governance role while also monitoring and overseeing district
crime reduction strategies within the county boundary. This
responsibility would expect to remain with the county council, at
least until such time as local government reorganisation was
either planned or implemented. Currently within the non-
metropolitan areas there is no other body that could conceivably
‘close the gap’ generated at the local level as a result of the
Home Secretary’s commitment to the creation of strategic
forces.
There are additional factors which are likely to become
immediately relevant as strategic forces are established. These
relate to the consequences of the expected creation of resilient
and proactive policing units at strategic level that are able to
provide adequate protective services but that also encompass the
‘Neighbourhood Policing Strategy’ which will be rolled out
between 2006 and 2008.
Although some cost savings of the restructuring plans have
been identified within HMIC’s report it is evident that little or no
reference has been made to assessing the impact of earlier police
reorganisation on police service delivery which was in financial
terms to prove not insignificant. The big amalgamations
achieved in the 1970s also came at some considerable cost. This
was to be best evidenced in the rapid decline in police patrol
activity (visible policing) that could be sustained by the new and
bigger police forces that emerged from police force amalgama-
tion at this time.
While technology and the use of mobile patrol was often
identified as an explanation for this decline, the major factor
explaining this was, in fact, the rise of specialist police squads
and units which larger police forces could now more easily
sustain (Young, 1991: 329). The proliferation of specialist units
offered career opportunities and professional career advancement
that patrol activity increasingly denied police officers. One
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consequence of this, it has been argued by a former senior police
officer, was that in places foot patrol very quickly became,
‘almost a memory’ (Young, 1991: 330)
Potential Impact of NIM Level 2 Specialisation on Visible
Policing
The experience of the last reorganisation may need to be
examined in the light of the proposed functions of the ‘strategic
forces’ which are almost entirely directed at ‘Level 2 NIM’.
Planned police units each made responsible for a specific pro-
tective service are also expected to support a level of ‘over-
capacity’ to enable them to respond to any demand placed on
them. There will not be, in the phrase used by HMIC, any
‘double-hatting’ among police personnel.
The planned role of the ‘new’ specialist units may serve,
however, to generate real tensions at a local level particularly in
relation to Neighbourhood Policing. This is because police
career opportunities inevitably will be seen as more achievable
through the new specialised units at ‘strategic level’ than is
likely to be so at district/BCU level. Clearly it would be
premature at this point to exaggerate the potential tensions that
may be generated between specialist units and visible neighbour-
hood policing. It is of interest to note, however, that among
serving officers personal disposition towards amalgamations has
been influenced by perceived career advantages (Martis, 2005).
In this context there will be a need for an authority outside
the immediate police organisation which is able to monitor levels
of police delivery and (more significantly) police abstractions
that could quickly serve to question the ability of BCU comman-
ders to provide the level of visible policing predicated on the
Neighbourhood Policing Model.
As yet the neighbourhood police model has yet to be fully
established. It is also unclear what the potential lifespan of this
model might prove to be. The strategy is not set in stone and
recent police history offers us a graveyard of ‘effective’ policing
strategies that were subsequently written off or abandoned (e.g.
Policing by Objectives ‘PBO’;‘Total Geographic Policing’ ;
Problem Orientated Policing (POP) and ‘Community Policing’ et
al.). It is sometimes difficult to estimate the shelf-life of new
policing strategies but experience demonstrates that most do not
usually expect to exceed 18 months to two years before suc-
cumbing to police ‘implementation malaise’ and the perceived
need for fresh measures or programmes.
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To protect local community interests and policing services
there may also be a need to establish boundaries that more
accurately reflect local allegiances, business links and crime
markets. These matters were overlooked in the course of the
1974 reorganisation and this has meant that police boundaries
have often proved to be at some variance with local demands on
police forces. This has an immediate relevance to the West
Midlands, where former chief officers have publicly acknowl-
edged the real limitations of the 1974 ‘reorganisation’ and the
need for further reform. In the case of the West Midlands this
was seen as the return of Coventry to the Warwickshire Constab-
ulary as being both necessary and long overdue (Interview Lord
Knights, Police Headquarters, Birmingham, 1985).
Local Governance of the Police
This brief assessment of the potential problems which could
arise from the planned police restructuring exercise suggest that
at both a police governance and local police operational level
there will, in fact, be a clear need for a form of sub-regional
government responsibility for policing. This is required if the
‘gap’ created by regional police structures is to be filled at local
level. This issue is of course most pronounced within non-
metropolitan counties. Here, quite unlike their metropolitan
counterparts, local districts are neither of the size nor sufficiently
resourced to be able either effectively to exercise a governance
function or necessarily develop local crime reduction strategies
upon which much Level 1 policing activity is now in effect
predicated.
The evidence to date indicates that insufficient weight has
been attached to the nature and importance of local police
governance. One consequence of this failure could, as a result,
be to call in question the long-term viability of proposed
strategic policing arrangements. More immediately there is a
requirement to protect both ‘local police functions’ and BCU
establishments while also providing effective local channels of
communication with the communities that are policed.
An important consideration remains that for most police
forces and BCUs the overwhelming challenge continues to be, as
demonstrated most recently by national survey, that generated by
Level 1 crime linked to alcohol use and anti-social behaviour
(Police Superintendents Association, 2003). Currently the only
feasible platform available for prioritising and channelling local
community demands within the planned regional police structure
is likely to prove to be a sub-regional government tier that is
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given a joint statutory responsibility for the oversight of the
delivery of police services and the delivery of local community
safety strategy.
A Rush to Judgement
Using his powers under the 1996 Police Act the Home Secretary
has recently intimated that while hoping that police authorities
can reach some agreement concerning the eventual elimination
of more than half of them he does not intend to delay the process
for an ‘inordinate amount of time’. He has also stated that he will
not hesitate to dictate to police forces the way forward in terms
of amalgamation if they fail to come up with ‘their own
workable preferences’ (Martis, 2005b).
Yet, despite the threat of forced amalgamation, a number of
police authorities and police forces are not persuaded as to the
advantages of the restructuring proposed by the Home Secretary.
Cleveland and West Mercia Police Authorities have rejected the
planned mergers and in the case of West Mercia the authority
has concluded that the police force could ‘stand alone’. This
decision has to some degree only reflected the widespread
popular opposition within the three counties that make up the
force area to any forced amalgamation with the West Midlands.
Elsewhere a number of police authorities and forces are actively
contemplating judicial review in an attempt to stop their amalga-
mation with surrounding police forces. In response to this the
Home Secretary has intimated, however, that where an authority
had embarked on judicial review and had ‘wasted money on
legal action’ he would draw a conclusion ‘about the wealth of an
authority’ that decided to take such action (Martis, 2005b).
It would appear from the forgoing therefore that, along with
closing down any exploration of collaboration and federation as
meaningful alternatives to police force amalgamation, the Home
Secretary also intends to financially penalise any police authority
that decides to seek judicial review. This does not seem likely to
create the degree of ‘consensus and cooperation’ that the Home
Secretary has also publicly suggested he would like to see
surrounding the planned reform of police structures (Martis,
2005a). It is the case, however, that the speed of response
demanded by the Home Office from police authorities and forces
may well create missed opportunities in terms of effective and
long-lasting reform of police boundaries and police governance.
Some interesting alternatives involving the use of a federated
approach, for example, have been identified by one senior
Sussex police officer (Dale, 2005).
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Unfortunately these alternatives are never likely to be evalu-
ated, let alone implemented. It is also apparent that while the
curiously break-neck amalgamation exercise initiated by the
Home Secretary continues, real reform of policing languishes.
As has been argued recently by the Chief Constable of Surrey in
relation to ‘workforce modernisation’, true reform requires the
introduction of flexibility and is about ‘re-engineering working
practices’ not police force amalgamations (Chief Constable of
Surrrey, 2005).
This, as in the past, is an exercise that has demonstrated the
appearance rather than the reality of meaningful reform. Of more
immediate concern, the likely absence of workforce modernisa-
tion is also likely to raise doubts about the long-term viability of
the configuration process to which the Home Office Minister has
attached such importance. Arguably only the introduction of the
modernisation programme can hope to sustain the NIM Level 1
Neighbourhood Policing strategy when big investments, in terms
of police establishment, are being made in Level 2 crime.
Conclusion
The 1996 Police Act gives the Home Secretary the power to
initiate police force mergers unilaterally where it appears to him
to be expedient to make the alterations in the interests of
efficiency and effectiveness. However, the same legislation also
provides for a minimum of a four-month period of consultation
with relevant parties. This may provide an opportunity for deeper
reflection about the nature of police reform than is ever likely to
be achieved in the timescale for change identified by the Home
Secretary.
The consultation period will hopefully allow for a more
comprehensive and meaningful assessment of police force
boundaries and the likely impact of further local government
reform. This most immediately would need to encompass the
issue of police boundaries. This is needed at BCU level in
relation to local authorities and in particular their future role in
local governance of the police. It will also be needed in relation
to the delivery of both community safety and neighbourhood
policing strategy at local level.
Professionally there is within senior police circles a commit-
ment to the better provision of protective services. While this
may be entirely justified it should not be a commitment that is
embarked upon at the expense of better police service provision
in terms of Level 1 crime. Ultimately how effective, long-term,
the reform programme, particularly in terms of the planned
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reconfiguration process, proves to be will very much depend on
the design and structure of the ‘reformed’ strategic forces. In
addition to this the nature and form of police governance at both
a strategic and local level will need to be addressed. Only this
can be expected to provide the degree of organisational stability
that a future reformed police structure will clearly demand.
Note
* This article is based upon a paper originally prepared for Warwick-
shire Police Authority and subsequently presented to the Local
Government Association Community Safety Advisers Group Meet-
ing, LGA House, December 2005.
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